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Contingent Participation: Media-citizen interaction in Wenzhou’s 
“Civil Monitory Organization” 
Meixi Zhuang, Xiaoling Zhang†, Stephen Morgan‡ 
 
Mass media play an important role in grassroots democracy, yet the dynamics of 
media-citizen interaction remains under-researched. Using the case of “Civil 
Monitory Organization” (CMO) program in Zhejiang’s Wenzhou city, we show how 
local media and the local government to whom the local media are held accountable 
shape citizen participation. We develop the framework of “contingent participation” 
to analyze the constraints on local political participation. Based on our observation 
of the CMO activism, we typologize four participation behaviours: (1) symbolic 
participation, (2) instrumental participation, (3) managed participation, and (4) 
transgressive participation. We conclude that contingent participation yields 
paradoxical results inherent under authoritarian rule: it aims to mobilize citizens to 
solve governance problems, yet denies the free flow of information and full 
participation of citizens. 
 
The Chinese government has rolled out a number of participatory programs at the 
local level over the past two decades that are designed to alleviate state-society 
tension. These programs cover a wide range of grassroots activities. They include 
deliberative consultations, village elections, public hearings and neighbourhood 
self-governance.1 Among the 117 cases of local social management innovations in 
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2011, for instance, 60% focus on citizen participation.2 Participatory governance 
innovations thus affect Chinese citizens’ everyday political life and opens new 
possibilities for both the state and society. These forms of what might be called 
“grassroots democracy” comprise different institutional arrangements and power 
dynamics, which are under studied.  
Many China scholars use the “state-society” relations as the analytical 
framework to understand local participatory reforms.3 Too often the approach is 
narrowly defined to focus on government-citizen interactions and the roles of local 
governments. It fails to identify other important forces. In particular, it neglects how 
the Chinese mass media influence public participation and the interactions between 
the media, local activists and state power. The mass media is considered an essential 
constituent and catalyst for the existence of the public sphere.4 But in China, the 
Party-state’s censorship has become increasingly sophisticated, making China’ media 
environment one of the most unpredictable in the world.5 Since Xi Jinping assumed 
the leadership role in 2012-13, his rule has led to a series of significant changes to 
Chinese domestic politics.6 To implement “democratic centralism”, Xi launched a 
national-scale “mass line” campaign, which requires Communist cadres to collect and 
listen to the public opinion and formulate state policies in light of public opinion.7 
Yet “democratic centralism” is anything but political liberalization, as there has been 
                                                 
2 Zhang H., Lu, Q. & Wang X., ‘The path study of social management innovation’, Chinese Public 
Administration, 1, (2012), pp.30–33; Yang B., He Y. & Long W., ‘Alienation of Civic Engagement in China? Case 
Studies on Social Governance in Hangzhou’, Voluntas (published online), (2012), pp.1-23.  
3 E.g. B. M. Frolic, ‘State-led civil society’, in T. Brook & B. M. Frolic (eds.), Civil society in China, (New 
York: M. E. Sharpe 1997), pp.46–67; Kang X. & Han H., ‘Administrative absorption of society: A further probe 
into the state-society relationship in Chinese mainland,’ Social Sciences in China, 28(2), (2007), pp.116–128; He 
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assistance of Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), German original published 1962. 
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Collective Expression’, American Political Science Review, 107 (02), (2013), pp. 326-343. 
6 Wang Z. & Zeng J., ‘Xi Jinping: the game changer of Chinese elite politics?’, Contemporary Politics, 
(2016), p.2;Y. Zheng & G. Chen, ‘China’s political outlook: Xi Jinping as a Game Changer’, East Asian 
Policy,7(5),(2015), pp. 5–15. 
7 For the concept of mass line, see C. Shih, The democratic approach to mass line in China”, Peace and 
Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 3(4), (1997), pp.353-371.  
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ideological tightening and increased press control under Xi’s rule. In February 2016 
during a visit to state media outlets Xi emphasized that the media must pledge 
absolute loyalty to the Party-state, confirming further ideological tightening and 
increased press control under Xi’s rule.8 
In this context, our paper on Wenzhou’s Civil Monitory Organization (CMO), a 
state-supported citizen group, discusses media-citizen interactions in participatory 
reform. It aims to understand how local state-owned media (“local media” hereafter) 
play an intermediary role between local government and the CMO, and contribute to 
the formulation of different types of citizen participation. The Wenzhou municipal 
government in 2010 first launched the CMO. It was a response to problems 
bedevilling local development such as environmental pollution, poor urban planning 
and administrative inefficiency. The idea was that CMO participants could pressure 
officials to solve problems through media exposure. The program is under the 
municipal propaganda department, but in practice the department decentralizes 
regulating power to its media agents. At the time of investigation, the program had 44 
subgroups with 6,000 participants. In 2015, the Peking University awarded “The Best 
Chinese Government Innovation” to the initiative.9 In the past five years, other cities 
and counties in Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Shandong, Guangxi and Yunnan have 
created similar supervision groups.10 With the rise of the CMO, the Wenzhou 
government claimed to have created a “Wenzhou Model of monitory democracy”, yet 
its scope and effectiveness remain empirical questions.  
                                                 
8 Guardian, ‘Xi Jinping asks for 'absolute loyalty' from Chinese state media’, February 19th, (2016),  
accessed 
at:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/19/xi-jinping-tours-chinas-top-state-media-outlets-to-boost-loyalty 
9 See an online announcement: “Announcement on the finalists of The Best Practice of Chinese Government 
Innovation,” Nov, 16th, (2015), accessed at:  
http://www.socialinnovationaward.org.cn/html/wmycx/gongzuodongtai/2015/1117/901.html 
10 See the following news links for similar CMOs in other Chinese localities: 
http://www.haining.tv/news/folder17/2016-02-03/105046.html (Zhejiang) 
http://xmzyz.home.news.cn/blog/a/01010047FD590CBAED6CF879.html (Fujian)  
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-02-26/123222019095.shtml (Shandong) 
http://wb.sznews.com/page/1721/2016-03/01/A21/20160301A21_pdf.pdf (Guangdong)  
http://gx.sina.com.cn/news/gx/2015-02-11/detail-iawzuney0008922.shtml (Guangxi) 
http://www.yn.gov.cn/yn_zt/yn_kmnb/yn_tpxw/201306/t20130603_10763.html (Yunnan)  
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A systematic study of the CMO activism also contributes to a more nuanced 
understanding of the complex pattern of Chinese grassroots governance. Most 
scholarships have identified its variegated nature, arguing that totalitarian, 
authoritarian and democratic elements coexist.11 But not many have elaborated on 
exactly why and how (i.e., for what reasons, in what forms and aspects, to what extent 
and on what conditions) do different kinds of participatory dynamics take place. Just 
as Sherry Arnstein’s classical “participation ladder” thesis has revealed, participation 
is not black or white. It varies in degree, depending on how power is distributed.12 Of 
late, a few China scholars have started to pay attention to this issue, either by 
typologizing participation, or identifying different risk arenas.13 They have shown 
that China’s governance reforms vary according to the level within the hierarchy of 
the political system and according to which population groups are involved.14 This 
study follows this argument, but goes a step further to argue that even at the same 
administrative level and with the same population group, there are still variations in 
participation behaviours and outcomes. From a local dimension, we discuss the 
opportunity and limits of sustaining public supervision under the current political 
illiberal environment. In particular, 1) how many risks spheres are there in Wenzhou 
and what are they? 2) how do risk spheres link to citizen participation? 3) how does 
each type of citizen participation operate in its own risk sphere?  
We choose the CMO as the case study because it enables an analysis of the 
nuanced interplay between authoritarian institutions and political participation. 
Firstly, the CMO case involves frequent interplay between participants and the media, 
                                                 
11 He B, ‘The Theory and Practice of Chinese Grassroots Governance: Five Models,’ Japanese Journal of 
Political Science 4 (2) (2003), p. 314. 
12 Arnstein, S. 1969. "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," JAIP, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 216-224. 
13 See Unger, J., Chen, A., Chung, H, “Deliberative Democracy at China’s Grassroots: Case Studies of a 
Hidden Phenomenon,” Politics & Society, Vol. 42(4) (2014), pp.513–535; Yan, X. & Xin, G., ‘Participatory policy 
making under authoritarianism: the pathways of local budgetary reform in the People’s Republic of China’, Policy 
& Politics June, (2014); Yang B., He Y. & Long W., ‘Alienation of Civic Engagement in China? Case Studies on 
Social Governance in Hangzhou’,Voluntas (published online),(2012), pp.1-23.  
14Yan, X. & Xin, G., ‘Participatory policy making under authoritarianism: the pathways of local budgetary 
reform in the People’s Republic of China’ 
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which can be hardly found in previous case studies. Moreover, the CMO project has 
survived for more than five years. This allows us to study local participatory reform 
within a longer time range, and helps remedy existing studies’ reliance on one-time 
snapshot fieldwork data generated from episodic social movements.15 During the past 
five years the CMO has produced many successful as well as failed cases. A study of 
these cases allows us to identify the factors that affect the making or unmaking of 
public supervision. This study combines in-depth interviews and archival method to 
gather data. Purposive sampling is adopted to ensure that important social groups are 
selected in terms of criteria that will allow the research questions to be answered.16 
Among the 47 interviewees, there are 38 monitors (jianduyuan 监督员), five officials, 
and four media workers. We choose a relatively large number of monitor interviewees 
to understand how they perceive and experience input from the media and local 
government. Interviewees are approached through either snowballing or cold calls. 
Official documents from newspapers, online websites, TV and interviewees, media 
reports and blogs, posts and comments by monitors on social media have been 
valuable for depicting the local political ecology surrounding the CMO program.  
Mass Media and Citizen Participation in China 
Some scholars believe that the media are assigned the task of improving 
governance and secure state legitimacy. Yet given the information the media generate 
and the difficulties in controlling the flow of information, they may facilitate 
coordinated uprising and threaten political stability.17 Others see them as stabilizing 
forces or safety valve,18 while still others consider the Chinese media the most 
                                                 
15 We will discuss this limitation in the literature review below.  
16 D. Silverman, Qualitative Research (London: Sage, 2011, third edition).  
17  P. Lorentzen, ‘China’s controlled burn: information management and state-society relations under 
authoritarianism’, Introductory Chapter, (2016), p.11, accessed at: 
http://peterlorentzen.com/research_files/Lorentzen_Controlled_Burn_Chapter1.pdf 
18 E.g. Zhang, X., ‘Breaking news, media coverage and ‘citizen's right to know’ in China’, Journal of 
Contemporary China, Volume 16, Issue 53, (2007), pp. 535-545; Brady, A., Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda 
and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009); King, G., Pan, J. & Roberts, M. ‘How 
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censored industry.19 The complex nature of the Chinese media leads to contested 
views on its relation with the civil society. The mass media is a part of the Party-state 
system.20 When social activism occurs, media workers may signal citizens about 
where the permissible boundary is. Some scholars hold the view that the mass media 
are crucial resources in social activism mobilization.21 These contesting views 
suggest that the nuanced relation between the mass media and citizen participation 
requires further exploration. To that end, we draw on two relevant literatures that 
relates to contentious politics and public participation for subsequent empirical 
analysis. Contentious politics refers to social activism such as petition, marches and 
protests which people enact to achieve political ends.22 Public participation, on the 
other hand, refers to civic engagement activities such as public budgeting and 
collective deliberation, where citizens become involved in the process that affects 
public governance.23 
Mass Media and Contentious Politics  
The mass media provide channels for citizens to express grievances. Because 
journalists could identify flaws and miscarriages of state policies, the Chinese 
government may encourage them to break information blockage and expose 
                                                                                                                                            
censorship in China allows government criticism but silences collective expression’, American Political Science 
Review, 107 (2), (2013), pp. 326-343. 
19 Tsang S., ‘Consultative Leninism: China’s new political framework’, Journal of Contemporary China 
62(18), (2009), p. 874.  
20 Zhao Y. & Sun W. ‘Public Opinion Supervision: Possibilities and Limits of the Media in Constraining 
Local Cadres’, in E. Perry and Goldman J. (eds.), Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 2007), pp.300-324. 
21 E.g. Chan A. ‘From propaganda to hegemony, Jiaodian Fangtan and China's media policy’, Journal of 
Contemporary China, 11:30, (2010), pp. 35-51. p.42; Sun, Y., Zhao, D. ‘Environmental campaigns’, K., O’ Brien 
& Chen X. (eds.), Popular Protest in China, (Harvard University Press2008), pp. 144-162; Cai, Y. ‘Disruptive 
collective action in the Reform Era’, K., O’ Brien (ed.), Popular Protest in China. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press 2008), pp. 163-178; Xie, L. Environmental Activism in China, (London; New York: Routledge 
2012), p.41.  
22 D. McAdam, S. Tarrow & C. Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001); S. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); T. Jacka, A. Kipnis & S. Sargeson, Contemporary China: Society and Social Change 
(Port Melbourne, Vic: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.258. 
23 See R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993). 
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wrongdoers within lower-level bureaucracies.24 In China, this function is referred to 
as public opinion supervision. Chinese activists have long regarded journalists as their 
allies. In order to arouse government’s attention, they often seek support from 
sympathetic journalists and leverage media exposure to magnify their voices. When 
contention occurs, concessions are likely to happen if activists can manage to locate 
claims in the media, who can lift petitioners’ claims “to the ideological high 
ground”.25 Some scholars go further to propose the “co-empowerment” model.26 
This model shows that both activists and journalists empower each other to exploit 
limited space in news coverage, protect professional ethics, enhance journalistic 
credibility and strengthen ties with civil society.  
Media allies are not always available, however. The media can offer power and 
attention, but they may subordinate activists’ goals to their own purposes.27 In 
political participation different actors manifest a wide range of responses depending 
on the degree to which an action threatens their interests. Current research reveals that 
mass media do not always act in full support of citizens.28 Because media are held 
accountable to local government rather than citizens, when conflicts of interests break 
out, the Chinese mass media may moderate popular contention and channel public 
opinions in ways that gloss over social discontent. This is reflected in many aspects of 
news production and editing. For instance, agenda-setting research has found that the 
Chinese media outlets, whether central or local, are highly selective in reporting 
collective actions and NGO activities, in fear that critical reporting may provoke 
                                                 
24 Zhao Y.& Sun W. ‘Public Opinion Supervision: Possibilities and Limits of the Media in Constraining 
Local Cadres’, in E. Perry and Goldman J. (eds.), Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 2007), pp.300-324.; Zweig D., ‘To the court or to the barricades? 
Can new political institutions manage rural conflict’, E. Perry & M. Seldon (eds.), Chinese Society: Change, 
Conflict and Resistance, (London; New York: Routledge2010), p.130.  
25 K. O’ Brien & Li L., Rightful Resistance in Rural China. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), p.62.  
26 Zeng F. & Huang Y., ‘The media and urban contention in China: a co-empowerment model’, Chinese 
Journal of Communication, 8:3, (2015), pp.233-252.  
27 J. Jasper, ‘A strategic approach to collective action: looking for agency in social movement choices’, 
Mobilization: An International Journal, 9(1),(2007), p.8 
28 E.g. Zheng Y. & Wu G., ‘Information technology, public space, and collective action in China’, 
Comparative Political Studies (38), (2005), pp. 507-536. 
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bureaucratic tension and social instability.29 Framing research also indicates that the 
media often distort movement claims and discourses in their representation of popular 
contention.30 Journalists may frame social grievances within the Party-state 
hegemony, to present reported events as safe and legitimate.31 Moreover, the media 
may repress specific forms of collective action if citizens’ views conflict with those of 
the State. When local residents marched on the street to protest at Maglev train project 
in Shanghai, for example, local propaganda organ Jiefang Daily framed their peaceful 
walking as “undermining social harmony”.32 Similarly, during an anti-PX chemical 
plant protest in Ningbo, Ningbo Daily aligned with the local government to criticize 
local protestors as “disrupting the overall stability of Ningbo city”.33 Teresa Wright’s 
study of student movements in China and Taiwan showed how students rely on their 
media allies to achieve their goals, but at the same time they worried that their action 
would invite criticism from newspapers, radios and television reports.34 
Mass Media and Public Participation  
In contrast with popular contention literature, literature on the relation between 
mass media and public participation is relatively scarce. Probably because 
participatory discourse often links with specific elements such as deliberation and 
rationality, existing scholarships tend to depict public participation as daily, peaceful 
                                                 
29 For agenda setting theory, see M. McCombs& D. Shaw, ‘The agenda-setting function of mass media’, 
Public Opinion Quarterly 36 (2), (1972), p.176; For agenda setting research in Chinese media politics, see Chen, 
D. ‘The Dilemma and strategies of the mainstream media’s reporting mass disturbance’, Journal of Southwest 
University of Political Science and Law, 17 (3), (2015), pp.61-67.   
30 For framing theory, see E. Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Easy on the Organization of Experience. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press1974). 
31 J. Nie, B. Wang, ‘Media frame alignment: the study of city newspaper report strategy on the citizen 
collective action--a case of Guangzhou Panyu’, China Media Report no.1, (2013), pp.105-119; Zeng, F. 
‘Traditional Media as the Mediator: Frame Alignment and Policy Response’, Journalism and Communication, 
no.1, (2013), pp.37-50.  
32 Zheng W., ‘Dilemma in NIMBY facility planning: a case study of magnetically levitated train in 
Shanghai’, Public Facility and Interest,35 (2), (2011), pp. 74-83.   
33 Ningbo Daily, ‘Jointly Maintaining the Overall Social Stability’, Oct, 27th, A1 (2012), accessed at: 
http://daily.cnnb.com.cn/nbrb/html/2012-10/27/content_540733.htm 
34 T. Wright, ‘Student Movements in China and Taiwan’, O’ Brien& Chen (eds.), Popular Protest in China, 
p.48.  
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activities.35 Many scholars portray journalists as a positive force, who facilitate 
public discussions and promote the development of the public sphere.36 
However, such thinking fails to catch the full dynamism of authoritarianism. 
Many places across China have seen an increase in public participation, yet China’s 
“local democracy” is fraught with deep contradictions. As He Baogang and Mark 
Warren have observed, authoritarian participation is typically limited in scope and 
focuses on a limited range of problems.37 Citizens are constrained by the fundamental 
Party-state principle that “government guides” and “citizens participate”.38 Scholars 
described those practices as “deliberative authoritarianism”39, “consultative 
Leninism”40 and “conditional autonomy within authority structures”41, a state of 
hybridity where control and deliberative elements co-exist.  
In short, current literature oversimplifies Chinese mass media’s behavioural 
propensities. It fails to fully recognize those specific factors that affect the mass 
media’s roles in participatory activities. Are mass media always a supportive force in 
the social governance arena as some scholars have claimed? How do they respond to 
and shape citizen participation under different circumstances? We need a conceptual 
framework to understand better the nuance of media-citizen interaction. 
Contingent Participation as Theoretical Framework 
This study draws on Daniel Hallin’s sphere theory and proposes the framework 
of “contingent participation” to understand the media-citizen interaction in the CMO 
                                                 
35  See R. Madsen, ‘The public sphere, civil society and moral community: are search agenda for 
contemporary China studies’, Modern China, 19 (2), Symposium: "Public Sphere"/"Civil Society" in China? 
Paradigmatic Issues in Chinese Studies, III, (1993), p.194.  
36 E.g. He & Warren, ‘Authoritarian deliberation: the deliberative turn in Chinese political development’; 
Fewsmith, The Logic and Limits of Political Participation in China, p.167; F. Zeng, ‘People’s Mouthpiece: How 
China’s Urban Newspaper Represents Public Issues’, Journalism and Communication, no.3, (2009), pp.93-100; C. 
Berry, ‘Shanghai Television’s Documentary Channel: Chinese Television as Public Space’, Y. Zhu & C. Berry 
(eds.), TV China (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2009), pp.71-89.   
37 He & Warren, ‘Authoritarian deliberation: the deliberative turn in Chinese political development’, p.269. 
38 Xiong G., ‘Let Social Organizations Play More Important Roles in Emergency Management’, The Science 
of Leadership Forum (24), (2015), pp.4-8. 
39 He and Warren, ‘Authoritarian deliberation: the deliberative turn in Chinese political development’. 
40 Tsang, ‘Consultative Leninism: China’s new political framework’. 
41 Cai, ‘Disruptive collective action in the reform era’. 
 10 
 
program.42 Hallin’s sphere theory describes areas of media coverage where a topic 
may fall. According to how specific issues are understood and received by the public, 
Hallin diagrammed concentric circles. From the innermost to the outmost they are: 
firstly, the “sphere of consensus”, which contains uncontroversial, widely agreed 
commonsense issues which “journalists do not feel compelled to present an opposing 
view point or to remain disinterested observers”.43 Secondly, the “sphere of 
legitimate controversy”, which is where contestation and debates often take place. 
Thirdly, the “sphere of deviance”, which includes issues that are considered 
inappropriate for news reporting, such as taboos. Zhang and Guo demonstrated that 
Hallin’s theory could be applied to the practice of journalism in authoritarian China: 
the sphere of consensus is the innermost zone which encompasses well-contained 
social issues; the outside one is the sphere of deviance, a zone of taboo issues which 
an authoritarian regime brooks zero tolerance; in between is the sphere of legitimate 
controversy, a gray zone where negotiation and repression co-exist between media 
organizations and the Party-state.44 
(Figure 1 about here) 
We adapt the sphere theory to describe the limits for political expression. Such 
limits appear particularly salient in an illiberal state like China where the Party-state 
influence is all- pervasive. Citizens’ cooperation with the media can never be 
completely free from power constraints because the media respond differently to 
different social issues according to their level of political sensitivity. Within an 
asymmetrical power relationship, the will of the state and the media’s censorship 
policies largely determine how far citizens can go. According to the degrees of 
                                                 
42 Hallin, D., The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University press 1986).   
43 Ibid., p.40 
44 Zhang X. & Guo Z., “Hegemony and Counter-hegemony: The Politics of Dialects in TV Programs in 
China,” Chinese Journal of Communication, 5:3, (2012), pp. 300-315. 
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political sensitivity, we further typologize four participation behaviours (see Figure 
2).  
Type I: Symbolic participation. Symbolic participation stays in the sphere of 
consensus because its discourse encompasses the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
ideology and government policies. Chinese government often delegates its media 
agent to launch this kind of activity to meet some procedural requirements or 
propaganda purposes. Other labels include “formalism”,45“ceremonial civic 
engagement”,46“propagandistic civic engagement”,47 or simply a “show”.48 The 
media do not allow participants’ free expression in this scenario. The objective of 
symbolic participation is not to delegate power to citizens, but to enable powerful 
elites to educate citizens. Citizens are alienated as a tool for government to achieve 
propaganda purposes and exercise social control.   
Type II: Instrumental participation. Different from symbolic participation, this form 
targets at technical, community-based tasks that citizens can directly undertake, such 
as garbage disposal and green space maintenance in neighbourhoods. Instrumental 
participation allows genuine public participation to take place, since citizens can play 
a crucial role in affecting governance. Instrumental participation stays in the sphere of 
consensus because it can easily secure support from both state agencies and social 
actors. Firstly, it happens in policy areas that are low in risk, without conflicting with 
                                                 
45 He B., ‘Participatory and Deliberative Institutions in China’, in The Search for Deliberative Democracy in 
China, L. Ethan and He B., (New York: Palgrave 2006). 
46 Yang et al., ‘Alienation of Civic Engagement in China? Case Studies on Social Governance in Hangzhou’. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Jiang Z., ‘Democratic living meeting becomes a show’, Dongfangwang, August 1st , (2014), accessed at: 
http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_28_105728.html 
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state interests or targeting at critical power abuse.49 Secondly, it yields to better 
services and public goods, which promotes government legitimacy and public interest. 
Thus, the local government is more likely to support civic initiatives of this kind. 
Journalists are also happy to report those innocuous activities. In this scenario, they 
serve as the facilitator through empowering local populace and communicating their 
voices to the public and the authority.  
Type III: Managed participation. Managed participation in this paper largely 
harks back to Cai Yongshun’s concept by the same name. According to Cai, the 
Chinese political system has flexible space for citizens to stage rightful resistance; yet 
such participation is confined within the boundary established by the Party-state, 
which affect the cost of political action and the odds of success.50 The same logic 
applies to the CMO activism, since part of supervision activities target at social issues 
with legitimate controversy. Managed participation usually happens outside 
residential enclaves, which affect local populace on a wider scope. On the one hand, it 
involves valid claims backed up by official policies, which state agencies could hardly 
dismiss. On the other hand, it may arouse vested interests, trigger bureaucratic 
tensions and social conflicts. Typical issues include official corruption, state 
malfeasance and policy failure. In managed participation, citizens are allowed to 
express their opinions to a limited degree, but they lack the power to ensure that their 
voices have substantial impact on the decision makers. As agents of the local 
propaganda department, media workers are assigned the task of managing supervision 
activities. Wary that public participation may backfire, the media may apply 
                                                 
49  For low-risk participation activities, see Yan X. & Xin G., ‘Participatory policy making under 
authoritarianism: the pathways of local budgetary reform in the People’s Republic of China’. 
50 Cai Y., ‘Managed Participation in China’, Political Science Quarterly, 119 (3), (2004), p.427. 
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censorship to contain popular contention while restricting citizens from spinning out 
of control.  
Type IV: Transgressive participation. Transgressive participation falls into the 
sphere of deviance. Inspired by the concept of transgressive politics, which refers to 
those forms of collective activities that cross the boundaries of the system and 
trespass into forbidden zones, we propose transgressive participation in our 
typology.51In this study, transgressive participation does not necessarily mean 
disruptive behavior. But because it involves locally sensitive issues, it can be hardly 
contained by the existing corporatist framework. Since different levels of media 
systems may have different perceptions of what it means by “politically sensitive”, in 
real-life situations many cases are actually boundary spanning. For example, 
accusations against corrupt municipal officials are usually labelled as “having ulterior 
motives” by a municipal government, but the Central government may view them as 
wake-up calls. In the meantime, transgressive participation also contains political 
taboos that are by no means irreconcilable with the Party-state hegemony, such as 
religious freedom, democratization and Falun gong. When transgressive participation 
occurs at a local level, the media are likely to stop acting as citizens’ allies. It may 
also act as the state’s accomplice and repress transgressive action.  
(Figure 2 about here) 
Empirical findings 
Type I: Symbolic Participation  
The local government and its propagandist apparatuses often utilize the CMO to 
promote state projects. The Wenzhou propaganda department calls such activities 
“compulsory action” (guiding dongzuo 规定动作) to stress the importance of the 
                                                 
51 McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, p.8. 
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CMO’s propaganda function.52A high-level propaganda cadre claimed that the CMO 
should spread “positive energy” (zhengnengliang 正能量) through “soft 
interpellation” (rouxing ganzhao 柔性感召). Another cadre was more direct: he 
believed that the program was launched solely to meet administrative goals set by the 
government.53  
The CMO is under constant pressure to perform symbolic participation due to its 
close affiliation with local propagandist apparatuses. Many monitors are willing to 
invest time to perform propaganda activities in the belief that their powerful allies will 
someday return to them crucial support. A monitor running a stationary store said: 
“Frankly speaking propaganda is unnecessary. However, if you don’t give face to 
them (allies), they won’t support you in return.”54 In symbolic participation, monitors 
are often portrayed as having a strong presence. But in fact they are deprived of the 
freedom of speech, thus functioning as no more than a backdrop for elite 
performance. 
Symbolic participation can be further divided into three categories. The first 
category is image building, where monitors perform as “mass representatives”. They 
act in city publicity films and non-commercial advertisements. On such occasions 
they either commend the rapid development of Wenzhou, or promote state-sanctioned 
moral values such as “protecting local environment” and “being a well-mannered 
citizen”. For example, an interviewed retiree once acted as a passerby in a “guerrilla 
interview” prepared by a journalist, though he was informed of the interview a month 
earlier.55 
A second kind of symbolic participation is ceremonial engagement, where 
monitors gather as vanguards of state projects. A typical ceremonial engagement is 
                                                 
52 Zhang H., ‘Wenzhou: Civil Monitory Organization becomes the city guard’, Banyuetan, no.1, (2014), 
accessed at: http://wzrb.66wz.com/html/2014-01/17/content_1583278.htm 
53 Interviews with two government officials in Wenzhou, Dec 30th, 2014.  
54 Interview with a monitor, April 11th, 2015.  
55 Interview with a monitor, Dec 30th, 2014.  
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live broadcast of “mobilization meetings” (dongyuan dahui 动员大会), which is 
arranged for the sole purpose of supporting the government’s decisions. In 2015, the 
Wenzhou municipal government launched a river management project named “Five 
Water Treatment”. With the aim of “building a beautiful water-town”, the project 
encouraged everyone to “take part in river management and understand the 
knowledge of Five Water Treatment”.56As requested by the Wenzhou propaganda 
department, the local TV station ran a series of live broadcast of ceremonies. Reports, 
meetings and rituals were carefully prepared in advance to ensure that no accident 
happened. Monitors performed various roles in those mobilization meetings. Some 
were dressed in light yellow uniforms and stood in rows before the rostrum as the 
audience. Others waved large red flags on the rostrum as a way of boosting morale 
(see Figure 3). Only one or two “excellent representatives” had the chance to deliver 
speeches after cadres finished, but without exception they were vetted and censored. 
These scenes were later broadcast to the public, showing that the “Five Water 
Treatment” project had gained public support.  
When monitors attend important live events, the anchors may not let them speak 
in order to ensure “safe broadcasting”. This happened in a monthly live event 
“Questioning Officials Time”. On that day, monitors prepared to challenge officials, 
but were thwarted. CB, an insurance company manager, was furious the next day 
when he saw a news photo portraying the “active involvement” of monitors: 
Photos do not mean the truth! Last night in the live broadcast studio, monitor JCH 
raised his hand many times when he saw two state departments pass bucket to each 
other. In front of so many people, he was not even given a chance to speak! This is 
                                                 
56 Wenzhou municipal propaganda department, ‘Announcement: Initiating the First ‘Netizen Watching 
Water-town’—Five Water Treatment Micro-news Competition’, accessed at: 
http://gov.66wz.com/system/2015/12/10/104658515.shtml 
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absolutely weird. Without monitors’ active involvement, the program “Questioning 
Officials Time” is very likely to degenerate into “comedy, farce and satire”.57 
A third kind of symbolic participation is inspection tours, a common way for 
state authorities to scrutinize projects operated by their subordinates. On these tours, 
officials would select citizen representatives to do such things as watching the 
blueprint of construction projects or going for invited fieldtrips, but they seldom 
increase the government responsiveness.58 It is difficult for inexperienced citizens to 
give input if the tone of the event has been preset. In 2014, for instance, the Wenzhou 
TV station organized a tour to a local “example community” to check the river 
management progress. Upon arrival many monitors found the water quality 
unsatisfactory and they frowned. However, the journalist who had been in advance 
contacted by a community cadre warned them that the general tone of this news 
coverage had to be positive. Shortly afterwards the community cadre joined and 
accompanied them as their guide. Monitors were left speechless. In subsequent media 
portrayal, the inspection results were invariably “satisfactory”, with only “minor 
problems”.59 The media manipulated monitors’ opinion as public opinion. Little 
space was left for free deliberation and engaged argument.  
Monitors have expressed strong disapproval of such activities. A cartographer 
complained: “This is just going through the motion. With our presence the 
government could brag ‘look we have invited citizens already so don’t say we are not 
sticking to democratic principles’.”60A costume shop owner said: “On those fake 
monitoring activities officials would warmly greet us by saying ‘we welcome 
supervision’. But how can we evaluate their performance in their presence?”61 A 
                                                 
57 Online comment by a monitor, April 16th, 2016 
58 Yang et al., ‘Alienation of Civic Engagement in China? Case Studies on Social Governance in Hangzhou’, 
59  For example, see a recent news report released by Wenzhou Daily, Su, Q, ‘CMO Examining 
Implementation Work of ‘Wenzhou Entrepreneur Goes Back’ project’, Wenzhou Daily, August 26th, (2015), 
accessed at: http://www.wzxc.gov.cn/system/2015/08/26/012112878.shtml 
60 Interview with a monitor, April 8th, 2015 
61 Interview with a monitor, May 20th, 2015  
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security guard who went for a food market tour was also critical: “I suspect journalists 
of negligence. By the end of the tour I stumbled across a few peddlers in the market 
who were selling mouldy foods. I pointed that out but the journalist just ignored me 
and called it a day.”62 
(Figure 3 about here)  
Type II: Instrumental Participation  
Monitors have real power in instrumental participation. Firstly, it involves 
community-based matters that are important to everyday lives. Secondly, these 
matters are usually concrete and specific issues, which monitors have knowledge 
about and can be addressed quickly. A ceramic shop owner referred to these matters 
as “chicken feathers and garlic skins” (jimao suanpi 鸡毛蒜皮). In instrumental 
participation, monitors and the media establish a symbiotic relationship: monitors 
play a big role in news making such as searching for news sources and recording 
evidences; in return newspapers and TV stations station power and protection for 
monitory activities.  
Instrumental participation has a different power dynamic from symbolic 
participation. Citizens can freely express their opinions, make collective decisions and 
pressure government bodies for accountability. Initially monitors only played a 
supplementary role and acted as commentators, but over time experienced monitors 
have taken initiatives to orchestrate investigations. For example, the retiree ZS is a 
persistent fault finder. He often wanders around streets where he lives to check urban 
sanitation and environmental upkeep. During 2014 he organized more than 60 
monitory activities, most of which were about everyday run-of-the-mill matters, 
including public bicycle maintenance, manhole cover maintenance, green belt 
protection, parking, and so on (see Figure 4).  
                                                 
62 Interview with a monitor, Oct 14th, 2014 
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Instrumental participation attracts the attention of journalists who report 
“livelihood news” (minsheng xinwen 民生新闻). Journalists are happy to help not 
only because livelihood issues are usually less sensitive, but also because local 
readers welcome news of this kind with which they can easily identify. A newspaper 
editor said: “For the past five years livelihood issues have been an important focus for 
the CMO. They are all about small things but people can feel and see them.”63 The 
media give monitors public exposure so that they become famous. Those who 
frequently appear on TV have become local celebrities. Once when a retiree ZS and 
his group entered a village, local villagers shouted: “Look, that’s Uncle Yin. His team 
is coming to help us!”64 They surrounded him and complained about their village 
cadres’ poor performance. Without media exposure, it would have been much more 
difficult for monitors to exert influence in the local community.  
Media exposure also reduces the likelihood of meeting undesirable situations. 
For instance, cadres accused of laziness would suddenly change their attitudes when a 
camera is pointing at them. An entrepreneur monitor ZF, who runs a health food shop,  
said:  
These shrewd guys have a knee-jerk disliking to us and always ‘play Taiji’ with us 
(meaning shunning responsibilities). But usually they give some promises if we bring a 
TV reporter. It is not the camera, but the eight million local audiences that they are 
facing.65 
Cadres’ words are recorded as evidence. If follow-up investigations find reported 
problems unaddressed, skilful editors would cut contradictory episodes altogether. 
Then they would frame stories with a typical title of “[xxx department], where is your 
promise going?” so as to exert further pressure on concerned officials in charge.  
                                                 
63 Interview with an editor, Dec 31st, 2014 
64 Interview with a monitor, Dec 30th, 2014 
65 Interview with a monitor, Dec 30th, 2014.  
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(Figure 4 about here)  
Type III: Managed Participation   
When monitors try to go beyond everyday matters and target social issues in a 
broader scope, they may encounter a highly unpredictable situation where legitimate 
claims can easily become controversies. For media workers, these claims often sit 
near the fuzzy boundary between the acceptable and the unacceptable. The 
government has to be responsive to these claims as they are directly related to public 
interests, and can help enhance government legitimacy. On the other hand, they are 
controversial because they may challenge officials’ authority, put pressure on state 
departments and spread “negative energy” (funengliang 负能量) to the public. 
Demarcation between instrumental participation and managed participation is not 
clear-cut. Whether a political action will be managed is determined by how much it 
challenges existing local policies and power alignments. For example, it is reasonable 
for monitors to speak for the vulnerable groups, but such actions are likely to be 
viewed as deleterious if they go against government policies. In a similar vein, no one 
would question the legitimacy of investigating companies accused of violating 
consumer rights, but the story might be different if these companies are backed up by 
the local government. Journalists are highly aware that activities of this kind need to 
be carefully managed. Firstly, media workers are full-time employees. They risk 
being fired if they are overly critical of officials. Local officials may take out their 
anger on daring journalists who exposed their misconduct, orchestrating punishments 
such as dismissal.66 Secondly, local media can directly affect the outcomes of the 
monthly performance appraisal of government departments. According to informants, 
media reports are usually being given certain weights in the scoring project designed 
by the local performance appraisal office (kaojiban考绩办). Government departments 
                                                 
66 Bernstein & Lu, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). p.186 
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will receive negative scoring if there is any negative news coverage relevant to their 
work. Wary of their careers, officials charged of wrongdoing sometimes pester 
journalists. The propaganda department may also repress negative news reports in 
order to give face to wrongdoers. Because of this, local media often take a 
conservative stance to avoid any unpleasant consequence.  
In everyday practice, monitor-journalist disputes are common. The disagreement 
could be as general as whether local policies are legitimate, or as specific as whether 
officials were practicing favouritism. Journalists constantly moderate monitors’ 
claims and behaviours so that they fall within officially acceptable boundaries. Our 
investigation shows that moderation is achieved through various editing strategies. 
The first method is cutting, which is used when people say something “inappropriate”. 
The second method is fabrication—simply distortion. The third method is selective 
reporting, including priming and framing--media workers may cite monitors’ words 
out of context, piece together different speeches into a coherent one, or deliberately 
highlight particular aspects of an event while ignoring others.67 
Journalists used the mixed method of fabrication and cutting in the “last nail 
household” case.68 In 2011, the Wenzhou government launched an urban planning 
project, including the building of a new road as the main artery linking the downtown 
to the railway station. The project progressed slowly because of problems relocating 
residents the project made little progress. One owner would not move, stubbornly 
staying in his house, which stood alone like an exposed nail in the middle of the new 
road. The municipal government gave the local TV station a political task, asking 
journalists and the CMO to expose the “last nail household” and persuade the owner 
to sign the tentative contract to get compensation and move as soon as possible. The 
monitors did not welcome the explicit intention of municipal cadres after they had 
                                                 
67 For priming theory, see Iyengar & Kinder, News That Matters: News & American Opinion (University of 
Chicago Press1987); for framing theory, see Goffman, 1984 
68 See Zhou J.& Yang X., ‘CMO Dialoguing with the last ‘nail household’ in Ningbo road’, Wenzhou Daily, 
June 16th , (2012), accessed at :http://www.wzsee.com/2012/0716/148465.html 
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met with Mr. He, the household owner. Different from other relocated households, 
Mr. He had a built-up area of 900 square meters. But the tentative contract did not 
mention the exact site for resettlement, or provide a fixed compensation package for 
him. All monitors present agreed that Mr. He had a valid reason to refuse to sign the 
contract. As monitor YZ stated: 
The government must give due respect to citizens who sacrificed themselves for the 
development of the city. They need reasonable compensation. ….. I felt so sad when I 
saw those relocated people cry. On that day a journalist asked one of them: “Do you 
support the decision of the government?” I was angry and shouted at that journalist: 
“Stop it! Are you human? Can you sleep at night?”…… Later I went further in front of 
the camera: “The ‘Three Revisions and One Demolition’ (sangai yichai 三改一拆) 
policy is implemented wrongly. I suspect the government of dereliction of duty, 
because for many years they are neglecting citizens’ interests.”69 
YZ’s criticism was “politically incorrect” not only because it was out of sync 
with the Party line; more importantly, it criticized the municipal government rather 
than a specific state department. The sharp contrast between a powerless relocated 
householder and a strong government politicized the comment, which was far too 
sensitive for full coverage. After the editors’ moderation, the comment appeared 
much softer: “Now that the concerned work unit has decided to undertake the project, 
it must make effort to provide the relocated household with a satisfactory 
plan”.70Such was the watered down criticism that a state-controlled local media could 
offer.  
Media workers also use a priming method to conceal the unpleasant parts of 
cadre-mass interaction. The priming effect is achieved by “calling attention to some 
                                                 
69 Interview with a monitor, Dec 31st, 2014.  
70 Zhou and Yang, ‘CMO Dialoguing with the last ‘nail household’ in Ningbo road’. 
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matters while ignoring others”.71 Mass media can influence the standards by which 
governments and officials are judged. This happened in a TV studio where monitors 
engaged in dialogue with officials on public transportation. In the Q&A session, a 
monitor had a heated debate with an SOE cadre. The monitor urged financial 
disclosure, to which the head refused and asked an editor to cut the episode.72 When 
the recording was released two weeks later, the monitor had disappeared from the 
scene. The head’s response was also edited, with the amicable response remaining and 
the confrontational one deleted. A similar episode occurred to a new item on public 
forum about river management. Those monitors who questioned the project 
timetabling were humiliated by two street committee officials, and a serious quarrel 
followed. The news report the following day portrayed the conflict as “monitors 
asking sharp questions”, “street officials giving positive responses”, with both 
showing “team work spirit”.73 Such distortion affects the public’s political judgment 
about the local government, leaving them with an impression that officials perform 
really well in these deliberative meetings.  
Media workers also utilize a framing method to selectively influence local 
audiences’ perception of social injustice. As gatekeepers, the media has the power to 
set agendas, and organize and present events and topics. For example, a journalist 
agreed to help homeowners to lodge complaint in a housing dispute. However, when 
monitors showed evidence that the homeowners were beaten by the police for acting 
against local cadres, the journalist backed off and refused to report this episode, 
saying that this was a separate matter. Subsequently, the news coverage focused 
exclusively on housing quality, without mentioning a word about the violence.  
                                                 
71 Iyengar & Kinder, News That Matters, p.63 
72 See the last fifteen minutes of the video recording, accessed at:  
http://tv.dhtv.cn/peoples/zqmyjjz/000004990.html 
73 Wenzhou Publicity Net. ‘The first 2014 large-scale tour of ‘river leader forum’ commences’, Wenzhou 
Publicity, Sept 5th, (2014), accessed at: http://www.wzxc.gov.cn/system/2014/09/05/011770209.shtml.  
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Type IV: Transgressive Participation  
Transgressive participation includes political taboos, activities or issues that 
deviate from the permissible boundary set by the municipal government. The major 
difference between managed participation and transgressive participation is that the 
former leaves citizens with some negotiation space, whereas the latter is not to be 
tolerated in the eyes of both officials and journalists. Taboo topics seem far away 
from an officially recognized organization. However, things changed in 2014 when a 
provincial campaign against illegal church buildings commenced. In April 2014, a 
Christian church at Wenzhou’s Sanjiang County was ordered to be torn down, as it 
was said to have violated the zoning regulations.74 Monitors were stunned, because 
county officials had previously lauded the Sanjiang church as a model project.75 
Locals speculated that a high-ranking official was hostile to Christianity and he used 
zoning regulation as a tactful cover.  
Angry monitors who suspected the local government of selective policy 
implementation decided to find the truth, but obstacles stood in their way. Because 
religion in China is politically sensitive, local media that the CMO has frequent 
contact with shield from offering any support. Journalists felt unable to disagree with 
the state authorities. In fact, official news coverage on the anti-demolition activism 
was predominantly negative. Activists were criticized as “instigators”, “having 
ulterior motives” or “allying with foreign reactionary forces”.76 Moreover, in fear of 
                                                 
74 Relevant news reports can found here: Ian Johnson, “Church-State clash in China coalesces around a 
toppled spire,” May 29, (2014), New York Times 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/world/asia/church-state-clash-in-china-coalesces-around-a-toppled-spire.html
?_r=0;  “China begins demolition of 'oversized' church,” The Guardian, April28th, (2014), accessed at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/28/china-demolition-oversized-church-sanjiang 
75 Qiluren, ‘Five thousand Wenzhou Christians resist violent demolishment by the local authority’, April 13th, 
(2014), Newsmith.net, accessed at: http://www.newsmth.net/nForum/#!article/Bible/73277  
76 Anonymous commentator, ‘What is the motivation behind smearing ‘Three Revise and One Demolish’ 
policy: four points on how to implement ‘Three Revise and One Demolish’ policy’, August 22nd, (2014), Zhejiang 
Daily, accessed at: http://zjrb.zjol.com.cn/html/2014-08/22/content_2795813.htm?div=-1#; Anonymous author, 
‘Protect legal sanctity and stick to fair principle: Yongjia government demolishes Sanjiang illegal religious 
building according to the law’, April 29th, (2014), Wenzhou Daily, accessed at: 
http://wzrb.66wz.com/html/2014-04/29/content_1634713.htm 
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jeopardizing their personal career, journalists were reluctant to help monitors to lobby 
sympathetic officials. Monitors had made many attempts to reach their media allies, 
but the media kept their distance.  
Transgressive participation is not always about human rights issues. Because of 
the institutional control imposed by the corporatist structure, most monitoring groups 
cannot monitor their immediate patrons—their affiliation/supervision agencies. As a 
result, some legitimate controversies slip into the sphere of deviance and are never 
addressed.77 This happens when the monitors’ immediate patrons – their 
affiliation/supervisory agencies, become the target of supervision. An example is the 
Social Relief CMO (SR CMO) at Wenzhou’s LW district, which is affiliated with the 
local Labour and Social Security Bureau. The SR CMO was set up primarily for 
monitoring social security fraud, but it never managed to wage an action because 
officials in the Labour and Social Security Bureau are often involved in such frauds. 
A monitor from SR CMO said: “A high-ranking official in the bureau abused his 
power to get a social security grant for his wife, but how can I supervise a man who 
shares the same office building with me?”78 Similarly, another monitoring team once 
received a petition letter from a group of villagers whose land had been expropriated. 
Villagers named the local cadres whom they suspected of graft and bribery in the 
expropriation. Monitors were shocked to find one of their immediate patrons on the 
list. They could do nothing other than secretly help village petitioners spread the 
information online. A monitor sighed: “Yes, the Communist Party says that all cadres 
are subject to mass supervision, but who would be foolish enough to have his 
subordinates expose his own mistakes?” 
                                                 
77 Kang & Han, ‘Administrative absorption of society’. 
78 Interview with a monitor, April 8th, 2015.  
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Discussions and Conclusion 
This paper addresses the much-understudied role of media in political 
participation by first proposing a new framework and then applies it to the case of 
CMO in Wenzhou. It fills an important missing link in scholarly literature on the one 
hand and makes important steps towards theorization on the study of political 
participation on the other. 
As the above analysis reveals, the extent of citizen participation is highly 
contingent upon how much the topic of citizen action is related to the interests of the 
local government and whether it conflicts with the local media’s censorship policy. 
The likely scenarios or contingent participation are summarized in Table 1. An issue 
would stay in the sphere of consensus if it involves minimum conflicts between the 
state and the society. The government encourages monitors to help propagate official 
projects and policies. It is also happy to let monitors act on matters as long as these 
are sufficiently trivial and small. But if monitors’ demands challenge state authority 
or cause political tension, they will be discouraged or even prohibited by the local 
government. In the participatory processes, local media workers are held accountable 
to the propaganda department rather than to monitors. They monitor the CMO on 
behalf of the propaganda department. They send participants signals about where the 
permissible boundary is, and play different roles in different contexts, based on their 
expectations of likely outcomes the CMO’s political action may bring to local 
officialdom and society. 
The contingent participation framework helps us understand the behaviour of 
local media towards public participation. Contrary to the belief that Chinese 
journalists would try to push for more autonomy in investigative reporting,79 what we 
have observed is tightening rather than expansion of journalistic autonomy. Media 
workers err on the safe side because of the unpredictable nature of political sensitivity 
                                                 
79 Zhang, ‘Breaking news, media coverage and ‘citizen's right to know’ in China’. 
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in monitory action and the fluid boundaries between different spheres. Despite 30 
years of profound changes that has led the Chinese Party-state to rule with more 
subtlety and even allow occasional negotiation with the media, media workers at the 
local level are not always willing to take full advantage of the “gray zone”. Journalists 
in Wenzhou are constrained from fully exposing the dark side of the local society or 
acting against the local bureaucracy. 
Contingent participation hinders democratic participation. Firstly, it does not 
effectively help to mitigate the principal-agent problem of the Chinese bureaucratic 
system. Media tightening impedes the vertical information flow from monitors to the 
municipal government. The latter is often left in the dark and could not effectively 
obtain the information about lower-level officialdom. Secondly, media censorship 
impedes the development of the local public sphere. What could be observed so far is 
an increasing gap between the media representation and the monitors’ actual 
performance. For example, the stance of monitors towards land appropriation is 
distorted. Our fieldwork reveals that they were ridiculed by some relocated 
households as “fifty cents” (wumao 五毛, meaning state-sponsored commentators), 
while they had tried hard to protect the rights of the relocation households.  
Contingent participation may follow two possible pathways, depending on how 
critical factors (the local government, media and participants) change and interact 
with each other. One is co-optation. Symbolic participation may overwhelm other 
types of participation if the local government becomes increasingly conservative. 
Since the open-minded Municipal Party-secretary Chen Derong left office and the 
new Party-secretary took over, the local public sphere has been waning. The CMO 
has shown a stronger tendency to compromise. Circumstances have pressured the 
CMO to take up propaganda as one of its jobs.80 Thus, it remains uncertain as to 
whether the CMO will be completely absorbed into the propaganda apparatus. A 
                                                 
80 Interview with a monitor, April 8th, 2015.  
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strikingly different pathway is backfiring. Public participation is an on-going learning 
process that facilitates civic consciousness and activist networking.81 As long as 
limited forms of participation exist, the CMO will continue to serve as a venue for 
potential political mobilization. At critical moments (such as those related to severe 
environmental pollution or policy failures), the CMO is likely to rise up against the 
local government and defend local public interests.  
To conclude, contingent participation reveals the contradiction inherent in the 
authoritarian political system. Media-monitor cooperation was originally proposed to 
solve problems, yet it has failed to realize its goal because in many circumstances 
monitors face the political alienation. At the heart of contingent participation is the 
irreconcilable tension between improving governance and maintaining stability. 
Improving governance requires citizens’ deep engagement in public affairs. But such 
processes can spin out of control: it may generate politically sensitive information, 
increase the level of social discontent, and even facilitate coordinated resistance if 
grievances are widespread. In this sense, the “democratic centralism” of the mass line 
that Xi Jinping promotes does not facilitate but impede democratic participation. 
While this single case study is limited in scope, the problem our empirical 
investigation has revealed is structural. Similar phenomena probably also exist in 
participatory reforms in other Chinese localities, which could make an important 
research agenda for the future research.  
  
                                                 
81 A recent article discussed this scenario. See Zhu, Z. ‘Chinese Environmental Actors Linking Up Backfired 
Government Action and the Spillover Effect of Contention: A Case Study of the Anti-PX Protests in Maoming, 
China’, Journal of Contemporary China (published online), (2017), pp.1-15.  
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Tables and Figures   
Figure 1. Sphere of Consensus, Legitimate Controversy and Deviance, and its 
application in China 
 
(Source: Zhang and Guo, 2012) 
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Figure 2. Four participation types within the framework of “contingent participation” 
 
(Source: see text for details)   
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Figure 3. Monitors in mobilization meeting  
 
(Source: Wenzhou TV station, 2014)  
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Figure 4. Monitors addressing people’s complaints in local residential community 
 
(Source: Fieldwork data, Photographed by Zhuang Meixi, 2014)  
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(Source: see text for details)  
Table 1. An overview of contingent participation  
Participation 
behaviour 
Risk sphere Examples  State’s 
attitude 
Media’s 
role 
Symbolic 
participation 
Consensus  Mobilization 
meeting, inspection 
tour  
Promote  Manipulate  
Instrumental 
participation 
Consensus  Garbage disposal, 
green space 
maintenance  
Encourage  Facilitate  
Managed 
participation 
Legitimate 
controversy  
Relocation of nail 
households, 
unlawful action by 
local powerful 
business 
Discourage  Control  
Transgressive 
participation  
Deviance  Religious freedom, 
critical power abuse 
by top leadership at 
municipal 
government   
Forbid  Inhibit, 
insouciance  
